FPSO Brazil (float, production, storage and offload) at Campos Oil Field owned by SBM chartered to Petrobras in full production:
Tanker Nordik Savonita tied up to FPSO Brazil in offload operation:
POSTED ONBOARD BY JOSÉ SARAIVA
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Sunday, January 28, 2007
Reval coming in, Lu Ban going out
Picture taken by the pilot boat boatswain after dropping the pilot on the Reval.Lu Ban
Lu Ban bound to Antwerp, and then back to the West African ports. Before I disembarked the captain told me that this was his last voyage before going on vacations... after spending the last 9 (!) months on board...
Saturday, January 27, 2007
Naftocement VIII
As seen from port bridge wing. Between the forward mast is possible to see the Pilot Station.
Naftocement VIII picking up the pilot ladder and proceeding to Leixões, and then to Málaga.Friday, January 26, 2007
Lu Ban
Entering Viana do Castelo loaded with wood logs from Matadi. Harbour tug "Cte. Águas" approaching on the starboard bow to pick the ship's tow line. This morning.Thursday, January 25, 2007
Big Brother...
Coastal VTS Tower at Viana do Castelo. The coastal system is supposed to be fully operational by the end of the year, enhancing the surveillance capabilities of the maritime authority over the entire Portuguese coast.
Monday, January 22, 2007
Friday, January 19, 2007
Sub...
I saw this Brazilian submarine named “Tupi” unknown class close to shore apparently in exercises according navigational warning received on board!!! Floating exercises I suppose because during all my call at Arraial do Cabo harbour she stand still in the same position and stay there a few days.
Look the detail of pilot ladder on Portside.
Photos by Djoy
POSTED ONBOARD BY JOSÉ SARAIVA
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Monday, January 15, 2007
Port Tejo being drydocked
Bow entering the drydock, first lines ashore.(Seen on the background Hydra J and Industrial Dawn).
Vessel is now in position and all fast. The gates are now closed and the dock will be emptied soon, bringing the vessel into the blocks.(Notice the bow thruster still running to starboard to keep her in line with the blocks).
Saturday, January 13, 2007
CEC Hunter with no rudder...
CEC Hunter arrived yesterday under tow for drydock repairs at Viana Yard after her rudder being completely torn off while sailing.
photos by Luis RéFriday, January 12, 2007
Under the bridge
Galp Leixões passing under "Ponte 25 de Abril" as seen from port bridge wing, some years ago...Thursday, January 11, 2007
A smaller Queen...
Douro Queen, the 2005 built passenger vessel, intended to cruise the magnificent Douro River.With 1587 t GT and 77,8 m LOA she is a sister vessel of Algarve Cruiser, also built by Viana Yard and operating at the Portuguese South coast. Fitted with two “schottel” directional propellers aft, and one bow thruster, she is highly manoeuvrable, a very important aspect due to the Douro River locks.
She has 65 cabins to accommodate 130 passengers, some saloons, a terrace and several other modern facilities.
Seen here sailing from Viana on her maiden voyage, bound to the Douro.Sunday, January 07, 2007
Black Coast
Black Coast
Bad news striking again the Portuguese fishermen community. A fishing boat “Luz do Sameiro” with seven crew on board sunk close to shore in Nazare area apparently when recovering fishing nets, the score at the moment are Black, three dead, three missing and one man recovered alive, search and rescue operations still undergoing by Portuguese Navy and other rescue corporations. First some psychological and financial help must be given to the dead fishermen families, and after some questions must be answered such as, why a fishing boat was so close to shore, apparently recovering fishing nets in a forbidden area, what kind of means the boat used to call for help VHF (CH 70) or other and why the rescue helicopter took so long to arrive on the accident scene?
As usual all kind of voices starts to shout out loud to blame this and that, looking for reasons and causes for such accident, from experts and less experts on the matter to the common people all gave their opinion about such serious accident. In to my mind just a proper enquiry by the Maritime Authorities should follow ASAP. I really would like to see stated in the final report not just the immediate causes but also the more profound reasons, that I'm sure will be found, looking for scapegoats will not take us any further and will not improve safety for our men working at sea.
We all know (I hope) that safety for those working at sea is paramount, good safety procedures at sea are directly related upon crews with right education, trained and well fitted, in resume having adequate certification for their jobs at sea, the boats must be in good condition, suitably equipped for the intended job and having all mandatory certification updated, but this is not enough, ashore the means to backup and help those working at sea like fishermen or those just passing through Portuguese waters in commercial trade should be of utmost importance for the Portuguese maritime authorities.
The SAR (Search and Rescue) operations, medical, technical or any kind of help needed, must be effective and promptly available, the different institutions with responsibilities on these aspects must work together and well coordinated. With the advent of GMDSS and implementation of Lisbon MRCC and Azores MRCC, conditions were created to have a modern and good SAR operations in Portuguese jurisdictional waters, is my belief that the MRCC responsibilities should not be restricted just to the watch on DSC emergency frequencies like VHF frequencies (Ch. 70) or all other SSB frequencies with SAR purposes or just wait for the phone to ring, but active coordination of all means at sea or by air, contact with other MRCCs and working as logistic centre for all “HELP” operations on the Atlantic vast area West of Portugal should be the goal. Some of you are already saying, what I wrote above, is nothing new and according GMDSS the role of a MRCC is exactly coordinated all means available to help all in danger at sea...
I remember when I was studying at Nautical school, to have made a visit to the future installations of Lisbon MRCC in Oeiras and the very bad working conditions and old equipment that the operators had at the time, I don’t know how are the conditions now after 17 years, but by the criticism heard on the media about the time wasted and delay to give proper assistance to the fishing boat “ Luz do Sameiro” it looks that something could be done better, I don’t want to judge nobody and if we know the conditions of work for the ones involved in rescue operations, maybe, we call heroes to the boys that along the Portuguese coast ( old ISN ), in the Navy patrol boats and helicopters put in risk their lives to rescue the others.
The name for this post came to my mind because I remember when I start working with British crews some years ago they all call the Portuguese coast as the Black Coast because they knew if something went wrong they hardly got some help from shore, fortunately now the things are better but there’s still a lot to improve.
All the best, be careful out there.
Bad news striking again the Portuguese fishermen community. A fishing boat “Luz do Sameiro” with seven crew on board sunk close to shore in Nazare area apparently when recovering fishing nets, the score at the moment are Black, three dead, three missing and one man recovered alive, search and rescue operations still undergoing by Portuguese Navy and other rescue corporations. First some psychological and financial help must be given to the dead fishermen families, and after some questions must be answered such as, why a fishing boat was so close to shore, apparently recovering fishing nets in a forbidden area, what kind of means the boat used to call for help VHF (CH 70) or other and why the rescue helicopter took so long to arrive on the accident scene?
As usual all kind of voices starts to shout out loud to blame this and that, looking for reasons and causes for such accident, from experts and less experts on the matter to the common people all gave their opinion about such serious accident. In to my mind just a proper enquiry by the Maritime Authorities should follow ASAP. I really would like to see stated in the final report not just the immediate causes but also the more profound reasons, that I'm sure will be found, looking for scapegoats will not take us any further and will not improve safety for our men working at sea.
We all know (I hope) that safety for those working at sea is paramount, good safety procedures at sea are directly related upon crews with right education, trained and well fitted, in resume having adequate certification for their jobs at sea, the boats must be in good condition, suitably equipped for the intended job and having all mandatory certification updated, but this is not enough, ashore the means to backup and help those working at sea like fishermen or those just passing through Portuguese waters in commercial trade should be of utmost importance for the Portuguese maritime authorities.
The SAR (Search and Rescue) operations, medical, technical or any kind of help needed, must be effective and promptly available, the different institutions with responsibilities on these aspects must work together and well coordinated. With the advent of GMDSS and implementation of Lisbon MRCC and Azores MRCC, conditions were created to have a modern and good SAR operations in Portuguese jurisdictional waters, is my belief that the MRCC responsibilities should not be restricted just to the watch on DSC emergency frequencies like VHF frequencies (Ch. 70) or all other SSB frequencies with SAR purposes or just wait for the phone to ring, but active coordination of all means at sea or by air, contact with other MRCCs and working as logistic centre for all “HELP” operations on the Atlantic vast area West of Portugal should be the goal. Some of you are already saying, what I wrote above, is nothing new and according GMDSS the role of a MRCC is exactly coordinated all means available to help all in danger at sea...
I remember when I was studying at Nautical school, to have made a visit to the future installations of Lisbon MRCC in Oeiras and the very bad working conditions and old equipment that the operators had at the time, I don’t know how are the conditions now after 17 years, but by the criticism heard on the media about the time wasted and delay to give proper assistance to the fishing boat “ Luz do Sameiro” it looks that something could be done better, I don’t want to judge nobody and if we know the conditions of work for the ones involved in rescue operations, maybe, we call heroes to the boys that along the Portuguese coast ( old ISN ), in the Navy patrol boats and helicopters put in risk their lives to rescue the others.
The name for this post came to my mind because I remember when I start working with British crews some years ago they all call the Portuguese coast as the Black Coast because they knew if something went wrong they hardly got some help from shore, fortunately now the things are better but there’s still a lot to improve.
All the best, be careful out there.
Friday, January 05, 2007
Carmel Ecofresh
Carmel Ecofresh and sister ship Carmel Bio Top were the largest vessels built so far by Viana Yard.
Built in 2003 for Israeli interests, Carmel Ecofresh is a refrigerated/multi-purpose cargo ship with 185,8 m LOA and 18 931 t GT that represented another challenge to be manoeuvred in the restricted areas and shallow waters of the yard basin. Special permission was granted, since port limit is 180 m LOA.
Due to the fact that most of the newbuildings have to be handled several times before delivery (shifting, sea trials, etc.) many times without propulsion, or any kind of energy whatsoever (dead vessel), careful planning is required. Taking into account the high wind area, lack of UKC, inappropriate bollard pull of the harbour tugs and the exceptional length (relative to the basin area) this vessel required special precautions such as an extra tugboat from Vigo, adequate weather conditions and appropriate tidal windows (chart datum on yard area is only 2,70 m…) every time it was manoeuvred.
In order to keep the minimum possible draft, these vessels are manoeuvred with inadequate propeller and rudder immersion (as well as bow thruster), making it very difficult to handle even in favourable conditions.
Built in 2003 for Israeli interests, Carmel Ecofresh is a refrigerated/multi-purpose cargo ship with 185,8 m LOA and 18 931 t GT that represented another challenge to be manoeuvred in the restricted areas and shallow waters of the yard basin. Special permission was granted, since port limit is 180 m LOA.
Due to the fact that most of the newbuildings have to be handled several times before delivery (shifting, sea trials, etc.) many times without propulsion, or any kind of energy whatsoever (dead vessel), careful planning is required. Taking into account the high wind area, lack of UKC, inappropriate bollard pull of the harbour tugs and the exceptional length (relative to the basin area) this vessel required special precautions such as an extra tugboat from Vigo, adequate weather conditions and appropriate tidal windows (chart datum on yard area is only 2,70 m…) every time it was manoeuvred.
In order to keep the minimum possible draft, these vessels are manoeuvred with inadequate propeller and rudder immersion (as well as bow thruster), making it very difficult to handle even in favourable conditions.
Anyway, it was a milestone for Viana Yard as well as for Viana Pilots that worked as a team to make it possible, and, when the vessel was delivered and sailed for the last time from the port it was a satisfaction for everyone involved…
Thursday, January 04, 2007
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
Safe (or unsafe) manning
Safe manning… what is safe manning on most of the ships sailing nowadays? Shouldn’t we be referring to it as “economic manning”?
The IMO resolution A.890(21) notes that safe manning is a function of the number of qualified and experienced seafarers necessary for the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, cargo and property for the protection of the marine environment and that ability of seafarers to maintain observance of the requirements is also dependent upon conditions relating to training, hours of work and rest, occupational safety, health and hygiene and the proper provision of food.
According to IMO, there are several principles that should be observed in determining the minimum safe manning of a ship, although I will be referring only to those related to watchkeeping and navigational duties since it is IMO belief that safe manning of ships would materially enhance maritime safety and protection of the marine environment.
First thing, we all know that hours of rest are not duly enforced, and that the records of the actual hours of work performed by the seafarers are far from accurate… to say the least.
Second, although the master is responsible for ensuring that the ship’s complement are not working more than is safe in relation to the performance of their duties and the safety of the ship, this is actually hardly ever done.
How many masters do we know that have called the owners or the charters telling them “sorry but we have reached our limits relating to working hours so we will drop anchor just for a little nap…”. Are provisions for hours of rest being placed on the charter party?
As for the number of bridge officers required to man a vessel, taking into consideration the size and type of the ship and the frequency of port calls, length and nature of voyages to be undertaken, from my personal experience at sea and now on pilotage duties for the last few years I would have to say that this number should be considered as a minimum for some circumstances and not as the normal safety requirement.
The bridge officers have been overwhelmed in the last few years by the implementation of the GMDSS and the related disappearance of the Radio Officer, the implementation of ISM and ISPS codes with all the check lists, all sort of records and procedures, increasing the paperwork to an unacceptable level, as well as the shortening of the crew available for maintenance of safety equipment.
On most ships calling this port, the master is the only person on the bridge with the pilot whether with or without daylight. And I am not just talking about the small coasters, I’m also referring to some larger vessels. In these cases, the master will be steering the vessel, adjusting speed, checking the position, maintaining the lookout (visual and radar), will be in charge of communications (internal and external), exchanging information with the pilot, reacting to the inevitable bridge alarms, filling the bell book… is this safe manning?
What about an extra bridge officer? Would that really make such a big difference on owners or charters income? Shouldn’t we consider the safety enhancement that such a measure would bring to the shipping industry, now that the latest investigations reveal that fatigue is playing a major role on all kind of ship accidents…
The IMO resolution A.890(21) notes that safe manning is a function of the number of qualified and experienced seafarers necessary for the safety of the ship, crew, passengers, cargo and property for the protection of the marine environment and that ability of seafarers to maintain observance of the requirements is also dependent upon conditions relating to training, hours of work and rest, occupational safety, health and hygiene and the proper provision of food.
According to IMO, there are several principles that should be observed in determining the minimum safe manning of a ship, although I will be referring only to those related to watchkeeping and navigational duties since it is IMO belief that safe manning of ships would materially enhance maritime safety and protection of the marine environment.
First thing, we all know that hours of rest are not duly enforced, and that the records of the actual hours of work performed by the seafarers are far from accurate… to say the least.
Second, although the master is responsible for ensuring that the ship’s complement are not working more than is safe in relation to the performance of their duties and the safety of the ship, this is actually hardly ever done.
How many masters do we know that have called the owners or the charters telling them “sorry but we have reached our limits relating to working hours so we will drop anchor just for a little nap…”. Are provisions for hours of rest being placed on the charter party?
As for the number of bridge officers required to man a vessel, taking into consideration the size and type of the ship and the frequency of port calls, length and nature of voyages to be undertaken, from my personal experience at sea and now on pilotage duties for the last few years I would have to say that this number should be considered as a minimum for some circumstances and not as the normal safety requirement.
The bridge officers have been overwhelmed in the last few years by the implementation of the GMDSS and the related disappearance of the Radio Officer, the implementation of ISM and ISPS codes with all the check lists, all sort of records and procedures, increasing the paperwork to an unacceptable level, as well as the shortening of the crew available for maintenance of safety equipment.
On most ships calling this port, the master is the only person on the bridge with the pilot whether with or without daylight. And I am not just talking about the small coasters, I’m also referring to some larger vessels. In these cases, the master will be steering the vessel, adjusting speed, checking the position, maintaining the lookout (visual and radar), will be in charge of communications (internal and external), exchanging information with the pilot, reacting to the inevitable bridge alarms, filling the bell book… is this safe manning?
What about an extra bridge officer? Would that really make such a big difference on owners or charters income? Shouldn’t we consider the safety enhancement that such a measure would bring to the shipping industry, now that the latest investigations reveal that fatigue is playing a major role on all kind of ship accidents…
Hope to have some inputs of our readers on this subject...
Tuesday, January 02, 2007
Calajunco M
The 2007 built tanker "Calajunco M" approaching Viana Yard basin for drydocking. This vessel was built in Vigo (Factorias Vulcano) and, as several other spanish built vessels, came to Viana for final works, namely complete coating. She will probably be sailing the next weekend flying the italian flag.GT: 13 500t
LOA: 161,1 mts
photo by Luis Ré
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